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('lutline  of  M.  Davignon's  s~ech. 
"Restructuring in  the ·tsos" 
Conference  of  the  Metals  Society - Amsterdam  13TH  September  1979. 
1.  The  steel i-ndustry is an  industry vi  tal to Europe.  Europe 
needs  to  make  its own  steel:  dependent as it is on  outside sources 
for  energy and  raw materials, it cannot afford to  be  dependent  for steel 
as well. 
2.  The  Community  has a  major responsibility to  the steel industry, 
for  the Treaty of Paris requires it to secure  the steel sector's 
future and  provides it with  the legal and  financial  means  for  do-ing  so. 
3.  The  industry's future  has  to  be  taken  in the broadest  sense: 
it means  not  just making  sure it pays its way,  but also, quite 
as importantly,  ~!fording the  workers  and  areas  concerned solid 
prospects of steady employment  and  development  either in steelmaking 
or in  a~ternative activities. 
4.  But  the  future  of st.eel,  and  of  the  steelworkers and  the steel-
producing areas,  demands  a  healthy industrial basis:  steel must  be 
a  sector generating wealth and  prosperity,  not  a  parasitic one  taking 
more  than it gives,  at the  expense  either of  the  taxpayer  or of  the 
consumer. 
5.  This  being  so,  Community  policy has  three  main  aims,  all 
interrelated-the reEtructuring of capacity,  the  r_edevelopment  of 
the  producer areas and  the retraining and  reabsorption of the  workers. 
Restructuring,  which  we  .are here  to  discuss  today,  can usefully 
be  viewed in the  context,  firstly,  of the  movement  of  demand,  and 
secondly,  of  the  movement  of  supply and  of  technology. 
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A.  Movement  of  demand  for steel in the  Community 
A.1.  From  1~65 to  1973  demand  for steel grew in parallel with 
national product.  Since 1973-74 it has  ceased  to  do  so. 
1965-73 
19?3-?8 
Average  annual  growth in % 
Steel  demand  GNP 
1.0% 
A.2.  This  divergence in trend is.due mainly  to 
(a)  contraction in the activity of the major  steel~ 
consuming  sectors. 
Average  annual growth in % 
• 1965-73  12?3-?8 
Motor 
industry  +5.1?6 
Mechanical 
engineer-
ing  +4.5%  -o.:;% 
Shipyards  +7.9%  -4.9% 
Building 
industry  +2.9%  -2.2% 
(b)  lower specific steel consumption,  i.e. smaller consumption 
of steel per unit produced. 
The  incidence of these ·two  factors in the fall in 
consumption  may  be put at around  3o%  in the  case of  (a) 
and  ?O%  in the  case of  (b). 
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B.  Supply 
B.1.  Movement  of capacity 
B.1.1.  The  investment  surveys  show  expected  crude-steel  capacity 
in 1982  as working  out 0.4 million tonnes below  that in 
1978 •. 
B.1.2.  This slight decrease,  however,  is the net result of 
a  considerable variety of trends at most  individual 
enterprises. 
Of  285  crude-steel plants in  the  Community, 
66  expect their capacity to be larger, 
35  expect it to be  smaller, 
184  expect it to  remain  the  s~me. 
On  a  breakdown  country by  country,  capacity increases 
•  are envisaged in Britain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and 
Ireland,  and  net decreases in France,  Germany,  Belgium 
and  Denmark. 
B.1.3.  Since  1975  the  enterprises have been regularly making 
downward  adjustments.  Thus  in 1978  installed capacity 
(202.1  million  tonnes)  was  10.7 million  tonnes  lower 
than  the  1975  plans;  in 1979 it was  12.3 million  tonnes 
lower  than  the  1976  plans. 
B.1.4.  The  present figure  for  1982  (201.7 million  tonnes)  is 
still well above  forecast market  requirements  (some 
180 million tonnes),  but  10  million  tonnes below  that 
indicated last year. 
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B.2.  Capacity utilization 
B.2.1.  Ayerage·capacity utilization rates for  crude steel 
were: 
in 1974,  86.9%, 
· in 1977,  62.8%, 
in 1978,  65.5%. 
For finished  products,  they stand at round  about  60%. 
Capacity utilization rates in % 
Product 
Heavy  sections 
Light  sections 
Wire  rod 
1974 
78 
80 
83 
Coil  82 
Hoop  and strip  78 
Plate  81 
Cold-reduced sheet  76 
1211. 
5S 
59 
58 
66 
59 
50 
63 
quite a 
1978 
60 
60 
60 
68 
59 
50 
65 
lot higher if  B.2.2.  These rates could  have  been 
obsolete and  uncompetitive 
of production. 
plant had been  taken out 
Taking as obsolete installations running at below  30% 
of capacity,  the  1978  utilization rates could have 
worked  out as  follows: 
Heavy  sections,  67%,  i.e.  7%  better 
Light sections  68%,  i.e.  896  better 
Wire  rod  64%,  i.e  •  4%  better 
Coil  . 69%,  i.e.  1%  better 
Hoop  and strip  69%;  i.e.  10%  better 
Plate  61%,  i.e. -11%  better 
Cold-reduced sheet  65% 
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B.2.3.  Between  1978  and  1982  ~capacity reductions are 
in prospect only in the  case of: 
light sections  (-4.7%), 
hoop  and strip  {-5-7%). 
c.  Mo~ement of technolo5y 
C.1.  Capital spending  on  modernization and better competitiveness 
is directed in the  main  to: 
(i) practically doing  away  with basic  Bessemer and  open-
hearth steelmaking,  with  capacity down  f~om 22%  ·in 
1974  to  8%  in 1978%  and·expected.to amount  to only  4% 
in 1982; 
(ii) vigorously  expanding  continuous  casting,  from·23 
~illion tonnes  in 1974  to  97  million in 1983,-an 
average  incr~ase of  17.5% a  year. 
C.2.  Much  less,  however,  is being spent  on  rolling-mill 
modernization:  evidently plants with obsolete mills 
prefer  to  carry on  with  them  as  there is nothine  else to 
do  short of closing  them  down. 
6.  What,  then,  is the  conclusion  to be as regards  the  restructuring 
of the  European steel industry? 
In a  word,  it is this.  Restructuring is proceeding:  perhaps 
it is proceeding  too  slowly for strict market  requirements,  but 
in  some  areas it is at the farthest limit of  the socially,  regionally 
and politically tolerable,  given  the  extreme difficulty of 
redeveloping in  the midst  of an all-round crisis. 
The  way  we  conceive  restructuring ·is neither  abstract  nor  theoretical 
it does  take  into  account what one  might  call. the steel tradition of  certain 
regions,  the  goal  being  to establish  a  solidarity between  those  who  have 
already  achieved modernization  and  those  who  must  improve  their position. 6 
7.  All  the  same,  we  must  be sure not  to let up  on  the restructuring 
process.  The  European steel industry's profitability position 
vis-a-vis its J:lpanese  and  American  counterparts has worsened  since 
1976,  some  f~w producers apart. 
In  the  United States and  Japan  profits have  taken a  definite 
turn for  the better since the  trough of  the crisis in 1975-76:  all 
their steel firms are  paying  dividends  this year,  and  the ratio of 
own  funds  to  borrowings is improving. 
In Europe  on  the other hand·only a  handful  of  firms are in the 
black after tax:  most  are in the  red notwithstanding higher  turnover 
due  to  tonnage and price increases.  .The  basic reason  is· not only 
their level of indebtedness--which anyhow  varies very much  from 
country to  country,  and is for  the most  part lower  than  the Japanese 
companies'--but  their actual operating costs. 
B.  Our  costs are  too  high  chiefly for  two  reasons: 
(a)  our  technology is inadequate vis-a-vis Japan's  (economics 
of seale); 
(b)  our capacity utilization is far below  America's. 
In both cases  the  blame  must rest on  deficient restructuring: 
there is nothing  for it but  to scrap obsolete capacity and 
concentrate production  on  the  most  modern  plant in order to  ensure 
the fullest possible utilization. 
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9.  Restructuring is being  hampered  by perfectly real and 
legitimate problems,  the difficulty of reabsorbing  the 
workers.  But it is also being  hampered  by alibis: 
{i)  the alib.i  for some  that others are not doing  enough; 
(ii) the alibi afforded by national aid  from  the  public  purse, 
to  those  who  are getting it, .but  a·lso  to  those  who 
complain  they are~  getting it, or who  are getting it 
by stealth; 
(iii) the alibi of unduly short-term social concern:  instead of 
creating alternative  employment  the  course is taken of 
preserving insecure  jobs on  obsolete plant or under-utilized 
modern  installations; 
(iv)  and  the alibi of the anti-crisis plan itself,  which  ~nables 
marginal  enterprises  to  carry on  without  excessive losses 
but without  the  means  to  renew  their plant  • 
10.  The  reasons  why  restructuring must  go  ahead: 
•  the  Japanese,  with  their technological superiority, 
have  the advantage  of  top  competitiveness in a  direct 
export market which absorbs  about  a·  third of their 
production; 
•  the  Americans  have  the  advantage  of their home  market, 
which  they are very good at protecting and  organizing 
for  maximum  profit; 
•  so  what  the  Europeans  must  do  is, 
firstly,  get a  better grip on  their own  market, 
and  secondly,  by being sufficiently competitive,  run a. 
significant.net export balance direct and  indirect  • 
.  .  .  / ... I· 
8 
In other words  the  Europeans  cannot,  like the  Americans, 
look to organization of their internal market  to offset low 
competitiveness,  for  they have  to  continue  to  export.  Yet  on  the 
other hand,  given  the pattern of the  European steel industry,  its 
geographical location and  the  fact  that it is so interwoven with 
the fabric  of  Community  industry as a  whole,  emphasis  on  productivity 
.alone is not  the  way  out of the present  troubles. 
11 •. Accordingly,  the  Commission  is going in 1980 to  propose an 
integrated programme  focu_sed  on restructuring and  underpinned 
by an an.ti-crisis plan consisting,  as in 1978  and  1979,  of an 
external and  an  intenal set of measures.  At  the  same  time 
restructuring will be  more  closely linked  to_market  organization 
so as  to  make  for  fuller utilization of  the  most  competitive plant: 
rising unit  energy and labour costs have  got  to be  offset both by 
higher  produc'tiv_i ty such a.s  only restructuring  can bring about·,  and 
~·  by parallel upping  of prices both within  the  Community  and  on  the 
export markets. 
12.  The  restructuring of the steel industry is primarily the 
operators'  own  business:  the  Community•s  job is to  ensure 
that programmes  are mutually consistent and  strike a·  fair balance 
between  economic  sense and social concern,  and  to  round  them  out 
with  the necessary regional and social schemes. 
In addition it provides above all the  market base  the 
industry needs  to carry through  the restructuring process without 
this bearing intolerably hard  on  the crisis-hit public  finances. 
But  make  no  mistake,  the Community  cannot let it be  thought 
by such as  may  be  tempted  to  put off restructuring in view of  the 
...  ; ... 9 
coming  market organization measures  that  Community  solidarity 
will  go  on  bailing  them  out  and  stultifying what  the others are 
doing. 
Term  is starting,  with  the final  exam  of  the market  coming 
up at the  end  of  the  year.  Those  who  fail it are not  sure  of 
a  place in next year's class. 
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